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1 Introduction
The increased demand for child care associated with the rise of maternal employment is
attracting the attention of policy makers and researchers alike. Over the last years, access
to child care has gone up in many developed countries (OECD, 2004), and is advised to
expand further by influential international players such as the European Union.1 At the
same time, studies on how universal child care affects children’s outcomes are scarce,
limited to short-run outcomes, and the findings are mixed. This is the first paper that
investigates the effects on children’s long-run outcomes of a universal child care system,
offered to the entire population.
An advantage of our long-run perspective is that we get round the issues of whether
short-run impacts of child care persist, and perhaps are amplified, over time. For exam-
ple, Baker et al.’s (2008) findings of a negative short-run impact of universal child care
on children’s non-cognitive development, could represent an initial cost of socialization,
with little or no long-run consequences. Moreover, if investments in human capital have
dynamic complementarities, then even a small learning gain in the short-run may improve
the long-run prospects of children considerably (Heckman, 2006). By investigating the
effects on adult outcomes of intrinsic importance, we also avoid reliance on test scores
and changes in test scores that have no meaningful cardinal scale (Cunha and Heckman,
2008).
We find that the introduction of subsidized, universally accessible child care in Norway
had large positive effects on children’s adult outcomes, measured in their early 30s. This
is true with regard to both education and labor market attachment, as well as welfare
dependency. In aggregate terms, the additional 17,500 child care places produced 6,200
years of education. Exposure to child care raised the chances of completing high school
and attending college, in orders of magnitude similar to the black–white race gaps in
the US. Consistent with the evidence of higher education and stronger labor market
attachment, we also find that children exposed to child care delayed child bearing and
family formation as adults. Our subsample analysis indicates that most, if not all, of
the effect on education stems from children with low educated mothers, whereas most of
the effect on labor market attachment and earnings relates to girls. This suggests that
good access to subsidized child care levels the playing field by increasing intergenerational
mobility and closing the gender wage gap.
To elicit causal relationships between child care and children’s long-run attainments,
we use a difference-in-difference (DD) approach, exploiting a child care reform from late
1975 in Norway. The reform assigned responsibility for child care to local governments,
and created large variation in child care coverage for children 3–6 years old, both across
1The European Union’s Presidency formulated in 2002 as a policy goal “to provide childcare by 2010
to at least 90% of children between 3 years old and the mandatory school age and at least 33% of children
under 3 years of age" (EU, 2002, p. 13).
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(a) Years of education: Cohort means (b) Years of education: Predicted effect
Figure 1: Unconditional cohort means for years of education in 2006 by treatment and
comparison group for cohorts born 1967–1976, and predicted reform effect per child care
place.
Notes: Predicted reform effect is generated from estimation of equation (1) without controls. As discussed
in Section 4, to arrive at the reform effects per child care place, the parameters γ2 and θ are divided by
the probability of treatment (i.e. the increase in child care coverage following the reform in the treatment
group relative to the comparison group).
time and between municipalities.2 Our empirical strategy and main results on education
are illustrated in Figure 1. Panel (a) graphs children’s years of education by birth cohort,
separately for municipalities where child care expanded a lot (i.e. the treatment group)
and municipalities with little or no increase in child care coverage (i.e. the comparison
group). The child care expansion started in 1976, affecting children born between 1973
and 1976 with full force. The reform effect per child in the treatment group is given by
the change in years of education for 3 to 6 year olds before and after the reform, in the
treatment municipalities relative to the comparison municipalities. Panel (b) takes the
size of the child care expansion into account, showing the predicted reform effects per
child care place based on our DD approach (without controls). Figure 1 shows a good
coherence between the time trends of the groups before the reform, and a striking change
in the relative outcomes after the reform. Consistent with this evidence, our baseline
DD estimations (with controls) suggest that the reform caused .35 years of education per
child care place (cf. Panel (b)), corresponding to an effect of .06 years per child in the
treatment municipalities (cf. Panel (a)).
To interpret our findings, we take a close look at a number of possible mechanisms. A
crucial point is the relative quality of the counterfactual mode of care. In line with recent
studies from several countries (Lundin et al., 2008; Cascio, 2009; Havnes and Mogstad,
2009), we find that the new subsidized child care crowds out informal care arrangements
(such as friends, relatives, and unlicensed care givers), with almost no net increase in total
2Throughout this paper, child care coverage rates refer to formal care, including publicly and privately
provided child care institutions as well as licensed care givers, all eligible to subsidies from the government.
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care use and maternal labor supply. This implies that our estimates should be interpreted
as reflecting a shift from informal care of presumably inferior quality, rather than parental
care. The fact that the reform had little, if any, effect on maternal employment also
means that it is unlikely that increased family income is the driving factor behind the
positive effects. Nor is an increase in the quality of formal child care, including publicly
and privately provided child care institutions as well as licensed care givers, a likely
explanation. Below we offer some evidence suggesting that the quality of formal child
care in the treatment area was not increasing relative to the rest of Norway.
Having access to high-quality panel data from administrative registers covering the
entire resident population and all licensed care givers in Norway, we are able to pay
close attention to the fact that the implementation of the reform could be endogenous
to children’s potential outcomes; Children living in municipalities with good access to
child care may be inherently different and would have different outcomes in any case.
The DD approach controls for unobserved differences between children born in different
years as well as between children from different areas. Our estimates are also robust to
inclusion and exclusion of a large set of controls capturing important child and parental
characteristics, as well as municipality-specific fixed effects.
To further increase our confidence in the empirical strategy, we run a battery of spec-
ification checks. In particular, the assumption of a common time trend between the
treatment and comparison group in the absence of the reform, is supported by the fact
that we find no effects of placebo-reforms, pretending that the child care expansion took
place in the pre-reform period. Nevertheless, to allow treatment and comparison areas to
follow different secular trends, we add municipality-specific time trends. It’s heartening
to find that our estimates are, in general, quite similar when including these trends. To
make sure that our results are not driven by secular changes between urban and rural
areas coinciding with the child care reform, we drop the three big cities from our analysis;
the estimates barely move. Motivated by Crump et al.’s (2009) propensity score approach
for systematic sample selection as a precursor to the regression estimation, we exclude
children from municipalities with very high or very low predicted change in child care
coverage following the reform. The estimates from this support sample confirm the pic-
ture of strong positive child care effects. Further, the results are robust to inclusion of
family-specific fixed effects, limiting the comparison to siblings before and after the reform
that experience different exposure to child care. We also take several steps to make sure
that selective migration of families into treatment and comparison municipalities is not
driving our results.
We might still worry about confounding our estimated child care effects with other
reforms or changes taking place in the same period. As discussed below, we have found
no significant policy changes or breaks in trends that could be of concern for our es-
timations. Importantly, there were no significant changes in the Norwegian educational
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policies affecting the cohorts of children we consider. On the contrary, Norway was known
for its unified public school system based on a common national curriculum, rooted in
a principle of equal rights to high-quality education, regardless of social and economic
background or residency. This is mirrored in very similar expenditure levels per student
across municipalities.
Our findings are germane for ongoing policy debates in the US and Canada, as well
as in many European countries, about a move towards subsidized, universally accessible
child care or preschool. Quebec recently introduced highly subsidized, universally acces-
sible child care, and other Canadian provinces are currently considering similar policies.
Further, the so-called ’Zero to Five Plan’ of US President Obama aims at making states
move toward voluntary universal preschool, much like the child care reform we study. In a
time where the returns to education have grown tremendously (Lemieux, 2006), facilitat-
ing equal access to child care environments that stimulate learning and skill development
should be of the utmost importance. In addition, our study speaks to a growing literature
on child development, searching for key determinants of children’s attainment. Our results
suggest that universally accessible child care improves the long-run prospects of children
considerably, echoing previous evidence from intensive early intervention programs in the
US that were targeting particularly disadvantaged children (see e.g. Karoly et al., 2005).
Back-of-the-envelope calculations also indicates that universal child care is a cost-effective
way of influencing child development.
The paper proceeds by first discussing our study in relation to previous research on
child care and child development, before Section 3 describes the 1975 reform and the
succeeding expansion in child care. Section 4 outlines the empirical strategy and Section
5 presents our data. Section 6 discusses our main results, whereas Section 7 reports the
specification checks. We investigate heterogenous responses in Section 8, before Section
9 focuses on the mechanisms behind our findings and Section 10 concludes.
2 Child care and child development
Recent research from a number of fields suggests that investments in early childhood
have high returns, especially for disadvantaged children (Knudsen et al., 2006). Studies
in neuroscience and development psychology indicates that learning is easier in early
childhood than later in life (Shonkoff and Phillips, 2000). In the economics literature,
Becker (1964) points out that the returns to investments in early childhood are likely to be
relatively high, simply because of the long time to reap the rewards. Taking this argument
one step further, Carneiro and Heckman (2004) argue that investments in human capital
have dynamic complementarities, implying that learning begets learning.
On this background, Currie (2001) suggests that governments should aim to equalize
initial endowments through early childhood development, rather than compensate for dif-
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ferences in outcomes later in life. The role of governments in facilitating child development
is particularly important, both from positions on equity and efficiency, if families under-
invest in early childhood due to market failures such as liquidity constraints, information
failures, and externalities (Gaviria, 2002).
Child care institutions are important arenas for child development, and expanding
child care coverage is an explicit goal in many countries. A number of studies show that
early childhood educational programs can generate learning gains in the short-run and,
in many cases, improve the long-run prospects of children from poor families.3 While
the results from these studies are encouraging, the programs evaluated were unusually
intensive and involved small numbers of particularly disadvantaged children from a few
cities in the US. A major concern is therefore that this evidence may tell us little about
the effects of universal child care systems offered to the entire population (Baker et al.,
2008). Nonetheless, it has fuelled an increasing interest in universal provision of child care
as a means of advancing child development and improving children’s long-run outcomes.
Our paper contributes to a small but rapidly growing literature on the effects of
universal child care programs. So far, the evidence is limited to short-run outcomes and
the findings are mixed. Loeb et al. (2007), for instance, find that pre-primary education
in the US is associated with improved reading and mathematics skills at primary school
entry. However, Magnuson et al. (2007) suggest that these effects dissipate for most
children by the end of first grade. Positive effects of child care on children’s short-run
outcomes are also found by Gormley and Gayer (2005), Fitzpatrick (2008), Melhuish et
al. (2008), and Berlinski et al. (2008, 2009). On the other hand, Baker et al. (2008)
analyze the introduction of subsidized, universally accessible child care in Quebec, finding
no impact on children’s cognitive skills but substantial negative effects on children’s non-
cognitive development. These findings echo studies by Gupta and Simonsen (2007) and
Herbst and Tekin (2008).
While the evidence on short-run effects of universal child care programs is of interest,
a crucial question is whether these effects persist, and perhaps are amplified, over time.
As noted by Baker et al. (2008), negative short-run effects could reflect that children
have difficulties in their first interactions with other children. In that case, child care
attendance may expose children to these costs earlier on, so that they are better prepared
for attending school. In addition, evidence from early intervention programs targeting
particularly disadvantaged children suggests that even though the short-run gains in test-
scores tended to dissipate over time, there were strong and persistent impacts on long-run
outcomes (Heckman et al., 2006). This paper circumvents these issues by investigating
the impact of universal child care on adult outcomes that are of intrinsic importance. By
3The Perry Preschool and Abecedarian programs are commonly cited examples of how high-quality
preschool services can improve the lives of disadvantaged children. See Barnett (1995) and Karoly et al.
(2005) for surveys of the literature.
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doing so, we also avoid reliance on test scores and changes in test scores that have no
meaningful cardinal scale (see Cunha and Heckman, 2008).
3 Background
In the post-WWII years in Norway, the gradual entry on the labor market of particularly
married women with children, caused growing demand for out-of-home child care. In
1968, when child care coverage was less than five percent, about 35 percent of mothers
with 3 to 6 year olds stated demand for formal child care (NOU, 1972). In the same
survey, 34 percent of the latter group of respondents stated that they were in fact using
out-of-home child care on a regular basis. Out of these, just 14 percent were in formal
child care, while more than 85 percent were using informal arrangements.4
The increasing demand for child care acted as a background for political progress to-
wards subsidized and universal child care.5 In 1972, the Norwegian government presented
the Kindergarten White Paper (NOU, 1972), proposing radical changes in public child
care policies. To (i) create positive arenas for child development, (ii) free labor market
reserves among mothers, and (iii) lessen the burden on parents and relieve stress in the
home, it was argued that child care should be made universally available. This marked
a strong shift in child care policies, from focusing on children with special needs (in par-
ticular disabled children and children from disadvantaged families) to a focus on a child
care system offered to the entire population. The white paper proposed a new law, in-
cluding provisions on mandatory supply of child care by local governments and licensing
for private care givers.
The Kindergarten Act was passed by the Norwegian parliament in June 1975, and
assigned the responsibility for child care to local municipalities. It further required mu-
nicipalities to map the demand for child care and to prepare plans for expanding child
care. Importantly, the law kept the focus on child care as a universal public good, and also
included provisions on educational content, staff skill composition, and physical environ-
ment. Though no actual requirements on coverage rates or expansion were implemented,
municipalities were legally made responsible for child care, and the extensive debate in-
creased public awareness and acceptance of subsidized child care as an important policy
goal. Illustrating the broad bipartisan political support for child care policies, the Kinder-
garten Act was passed with the support of all major parties in parliament.
In succeeding years, the previously slow expansion in subsidized child care accelerated
rapidly. From a total coverage rate of less than 10 percent for 3 to 6 year olds in 1975,
4Relatives stand out as the largest group of informal care givers at 35 percent, followed by play parks
at 20 percent, maids at 14 percent, other unlicensed care givers at 10 percent, and finally more irregular
arrangements (such as neighbors and friends) at 7 percent (NOU, 1972).
5See Leira (1992, ch. 4) for a detailed survey of the history of Norwegian child care policies since
WWII.
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Figure 2: Child care coverage rate in Norway 1960–1996 for children 3–6 years old.
Sources: Administrative data for 1972–1996. Data for 1960–1972 from NOU (1972), Table II.1.
coverage had shot up above 28 percent by 1979. Over the period, a total of more than
32,000 child care places were established, more than a doubling from the 1975-level. By
contrast, there was almost no child care coverage for 1 and 2 year olds during this period.
Figure 2 draws child care coverage rates in Norway from 1960 to 1996 for 3 to 6 year olds.
As is apparent from the figure, there has been strong growth in child care coverage rates
since 1975, particularly in the early years.
Table 1 reports child care institutions by owner biannually from 1973 through 1981,
and shows the strong growth in municipal and cooperative child care centers. Over the
period, the share of private centers decreased from 35 to 20 percent, driven almost entirely
by a decline in the share of centers run by private organizations.
Table 1: Child care institutions by ownership structure
1973 1975 1977 1979 1981
Private (%) 35.4 28.4 26.7 26.3 21.9
Municipality (%) 43.9 48.6 45.4 46.9 51.2
Church (%) 7.9 7.3 8.0 8.6 8.6
Cooperatives (%) 4.1 5.6 8.2 9.7 10.0
No. of child care institutions 684 880 1,469 2,294 2,754
No. of children in child care (3–6 y.o.) 19,010 25,536 43,239 63,218 73,152
Coverage rate (3–6 y.o., %) 7.1 10.0 17.6 28.1 34.2
Notes: Private ownership indicates ownership by a private firm, organisation or foun-
dation. Cooperatives are parental or residential. Categories not reported are ownership
by state, regions and other.
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We might worry about confounding the estimated child care effects with other reforms
or changes taking place in the same period. However, we have found no significant reforms
or breaks in trends that could be of concern for our estimations. An extension in ma-
ternity leave implemented in 1977 did not affect the children in our sample directly, but
could potentially influence family size, which could in turn matter for child development.
However, the reform was nationwide, and should be controlled for by cohort fixed-effects.
In addition, our rich set of controls may pick up potentially remaining effects of this policy
change.
Importantly, there were no significant changes in the Norwegian educational policies
affecting the cohorts of children we consider, born 1967–1976.6 At the end of WWII, the
Norwegian school system was based on a seven-year compulsory education free of charge
for all children from the age of 7, before splitting into vocational and academic tracks of
various length. There were two major educational reform periods in Norway after WWII;
The first reform period was in the late 1960s and early 1970s, whereas the second reform
period was in the 1990s.
In the first reform period, Norway cemented its unified school system, rooted in a
principle of equal rights to high-quality education, regardless of social and economic back-
ground or residency. This manifested itself in a major school reform in 1969, expanding
compulsory education to nine years. At the same time, the curriculum was standardized
to ensure that government educational standards were met nationwide. The collective ob-
jectives and principles for teaching were laid down in this national curriculum. In 1974,
the various post-compulsory school tracks were merged into a three-year high school sys-
tem of academic or vocational studies. In this unified school system, there was no room
for different types of schools existing in parallel, with the result that there were almost no
private schools; For example, the number of pupils in private schools comprised only half
a percent of the total number of children of compulsory school age in 1970. Moreover, the
expenditure levels per student across municipalities were very similar. The policy changes
in the first reform period affect all the cohorts of children included in our analysis.
After two decades with only minor changes in the educational system, a reform in
1994 granted the statutory right to three years of high school for all youth between 16
and 19 years, starting with children born in 1978. Moreover, the curriculum was altered
so that all high school students, in academic tracks or vocational tracks, followed the same
basic courses in the first year. These policy changes did not affect the cohorts of children
included in our analysis.
6See Telhaug et al. (2006) and Volckmar (2008) for an in-depth discussion of the Norwegian educational
system since the 1950s.
10
4 Empirical strategy
To estimate the effect of universal child care on children’s outcomes, we apply a DD ap-
proach similar to Baker et al. (2008). Our empirical strategy is the following: We compare
the adult outcome of interest for 3 to 6 year olds before and after the reform, from mu-
nicipalities where child care expanded a lot (i.e. the treatment group) and municipalities
with little or no increase in child care coverage (i.e. the comparison group).
The child care expansion started in 1976, affecting the post-reform cohorts born 1973–
1976 with full force, and to a lesser extent the phase-in cohorts born 1970–1972. The pre-
reform cohorts consist of children born in the period 1967–1969. We consider the period
1976–1979 as the child care expansion period. Starting in 1976 gives the municipalities
some time to plan and react to the policy change. Also, 1976–1979 was the period with
the largest growth in child care coverage. In the robustness analysis, we make sure that
our results are robust to changes in the exact choice of expansion period.
To define the treatment and comparison group, we order the municipalities according
to the percentage point increase in child care coverage rates from 1976 to 1979. We
then separate the sample at the median, letting the upper half constitute the treatment
municipalities and the lower half the comparison municipalities. Figure 3 displays child
care coverage before and after the 1975 reform in treatment and comparison municipalities
(weighted by population size). The graphs move almost in parallel before the reform, while
the child care coverage of the treatment municipalities kinks heavily after the reform. This
illustrates that our study compares municipalities that differ distinctly in terms of changes
in child care coverage within a narrow time frame.
Our main regression model, estimated by OLS over the sample of children born during
the period 1967–1976, can be defined as
Yijt = ψt + γ1Treatedi + γ2(Treatedi × Phaseint) + θ(Treatedi × Postt) (1)
+X ′ijtβ + ijt
where Y is the outcome of interest measured in 2006, i indexes child, j indexes family, and
t indexes the year the child turns 3 years old. The vector of covariates X includes dummy
variables for parent’s birth cohort, their education when the child is 2 years old, their
age at first birth, the number of older siblings (also capturing birth order) and relocation
between municipalities within treatment/comparison area, the child’s sex and immigrant
status, as well as municipality-specific fixed effects. The error term ijt is clustered on
the child’s mother, allowing for dependence in the residuals of siblings. The dummy
variable Treatedi is equal to 1 if child i lives in the treatment area, Phaseint and Postt
are dummy variables equal to 1 when t ∈ [1973, 1975] and t ∈ [1976, 1979] respectively,
while ψt are cohort-specific fixed effects. The impact of the child care expansion is given
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Figure 3: Child care coverage rates 1972–1985 for 3–6 year olds in treatment and com-
parison municipalities
Notes: Treatment (comparison) municipalities are above (below) the median in child care coverage growth
from 1976 to 1979.
by the parameter θ.7
Like Baker et al. (2008), our regression model produces intention-to-treat (ITT) ef-
fects, given by θ, as we estimate the reduced form impacts on all children born from
post-reform cohorts who reside in the treatment area. An advantage of the ITT para-
meter is that it captures the full reform impact of changes in both formal and informal
care arrangements, as well as any peer effects on children who were not attending child
care. However, since this parameter averages the reform effects over all children in the
municipality, it reflects poorly the size of the child care expansion. To arrive at the
treatment-on-the-treated (TT) effects, we follow Baker et al. and scale the ITT parame-
ter with the probability of treatment. Specifically, we divide the ITT parameter with the
increase in child care coverage following the reform in the treatment group relative to the
comparison group. For example, TT = ITT/0.1785 in our baseline specification. The TT
parameter gives us the effect of child care exposure – per child care place – on children
born in post-reform cohorts who reside in the treatment area. In our main results, we
report both the ITT and the TT estimates.
The DD approach controls for unobserved differences between children born in differ-
7Some of the outcomes of interest are limited dependent variables. In these cases, our linear probability
model will be the best least-squares approximation of the true conditional expectation function. As noted
by Angrist (2001), if there are no covariates or they are discrete, as in our case, linear models are no
less appropriate for limited dependent variables than for other types of dependent variables. In any case,
we have checked that our results are robust to alternative approximations of the conditional expectation
function, estimating Logit and Probit models.
12
ent years as well as between children from treatment and comparison municipalities. The
identifying assumption is then that the change in the outcome of interest for 3 to 6 year
olds before and after the reform would have been the same in the treatment municipal-
ities as in the comparison municipalities, in the absence of the reform. A concern could
be that the time trend in children’s outcomes differs by, say, parent’s education, while
there are systematic differences in parental education between treatment and comparison
municipalities. To address such concerns for selection bias, we estimate equation (1) with
and without the set of controls X.
To further increase the confidence in our empirical strategy, we run a battery of spec-
ification checks. In particular, to investigate the assumption of a common time trend
between the treatment and comparison group in the absence of the reform we perform
placebo-reforms, pretending that the child care expansion took place in the pre-reform
period. To allow treatment and comparison areas to follow different trends, we further
estimate equation (1) with municipality-specific time trends. To make sure that our re-
sults are not driven by secular changes between urban and rural areas coinciding with the
child care reform, we drop the three big cities from our analysis. Motivated by Crump
et al.’s (2009) use of propensity score for systematic sample selection as a precursor to
the regression estimation, we exclude children from municipalities with very high or very
low predicted change in child care coverage following the reform. The idea is that the
assumption of a common time trend may be more plausible if there is stronger overlap in
the covariate distribution between the treatment and comparison municipalities. Unlike
previous studies using a DD approach to examine universal child care and children’s out-
comes, we also add family-specific fixed effects, limiting the comparison to siblings before
and after the reform that have the same family background but experience different expo-
sure to child care. In addition, we take several steps to address the concern for selective
migration of families into treatment and comparison municipalities.
Our DD estimator captures the average effect of the additional child care slots follow-
ing the reform in the treatment municipalities relative to the comparison municipalities.
Figure 4 draws histograms of the distributions of municipalities by child care coverage
rate in 1976 and 1979. It shows a fairly good coherence in child care coverage rates
between the treatment and comparison municipalities before the reform, and a striking
difference after the reform. It is also evident that the treatment intensity varies within
the two groups of municipalities. In the robustness analysis, we consider variations in
the treatment intensity by changing the child care coverage cut-off defining the treatment
and comparison municipalities. In addition, we follow Berlinski et al. (2009) in regressing
child outcome on child care coverage rate in each municipality, controlling for cohort and
municipality fixed-effects, as well as a set of controls. This regression model, estimated
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by OLS over the sample of children born during the period 1967–1976, can be defined as
Yijt = δt + ζCCit +X
′
ijtϕ+ ijt (2)
where CCit is the average child care rate in the municipality of child i from the year t
when the child turns 3 years old until, but not including, year t+4 when he or she turns 7
and starts primary school. It should be noted that equation 2 assumes constant marginal
effects of additional child care slots.
5 Data
Our data is based on administrative registers from Statistics Norway covering the entire
resident population of Norway from 1967–2006. The data contains unique individual iden-
tifiers that allow us to match parents to their children. As we observe each child’s date of
birth, we are able to construct birth cohort indicators for every child in each family. The
family and demographic files are merged through the unique child identifier with a wide
range of his or her adult outcomes measured in 2006, including educational attainment,
earnings, welfare dependency, and household type and composition. The information on
educational attainment is based on annual reports from Norwegian educational establish-
ments, whereas the income and welfare data are collected from tax records and other
administrative registers. The household information is from the Central Population Reg-
ister, which is updated annually by the local population registries and verified by the
Norwegian Tax Authority.
Importantly, we also have administrative register data on all formal child care insti-
tutions and their location from 1972, reported directly from the institutions themselves
to Statistics Norway. All licensed care givers are required to report annually the number
of children in child care by age. Merging this data with the demographic files contain-
ing information about the total number of children according to age and residency, we
construct a time series of annual child care coverage (by age of child) in each of the 418
municipalities. The coverage and reliability of Norwegian register data is considered to
be exceptional, as is documented by the fact that they received the highest rating in a
data quality assessment conducted by Atkinson et al. (1995).
We start with the entire population of children born during the period 1967–1976,
who were alive and resident in Norway in 2006. This sample consists of 575,300 children,
spanning these 10 birth cohorts. The choice of cohorts serves three purposes. Since our
outcomes are measured in 2006, the treated children are between 30 and 33 years old at the
time of measurement, which should be suitable when assessing children’s adult outcomes
(see e.g. Haider and Solon, 2006). Second, since treatment and comparison groups are
defined by the expansion in child care from 1976 to 1979, the regional and time variation
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(a) 1976
(b) 1979
Figure 4: Distribution of treatment and comparison municipalities by child care coverage
rate for 3 to 6 year olds in 1976 (top panel) and 1979 (bottom panel)
Notes: Pre-reform cohorts are born 1967–1969, phase-in-cohorts are born 1970–1972, and post-reform
cohorts are born 1973–1976. Treatment (comparison) municipalities are above (below) the median in
child care coverage growth from 1976 to 1979.
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between the two groups breaks down as we move away from 1979. Indeed, the coverage
rates do converge slowly after 1979. Finally, to ensure comparability of children before
and after the reform, we do not want the cohorts to be too far apart.
We restrict the sample to children whose mothers were married at the end of 1975,
which makes up about 92 percent of the above sample. The reason for this choice is that
our family data does not allow us to distinguish between cohabitants and single parents
in these years. As parents’ family formation may be endogenous to the reform, we only
condition on pre-reform marital status. To avoid migration induced by the child care
reform, we also exclude children from families that move between treatment and compar-
ison municipalities during the expansion period, which makes up less than 5 percent of
the above sample. Finally, we exclude a handful of children whose mother had a birth
before she was aged 16 or after she was 49. Rather than dropping observations where
information on parents’ education is missing, we include a separate category for missing
values. The education of the parents is measured when the child is 2 years old. The
number of older siblings relates to children born to each mother. The final sample used in
the estimations consists of 499,026 children from 318,367 families, which makes up about
87 percent of the children from each cohort.
When interpreting our results, it is necessary to have these sample selection criteria
in mind. We focus on children of married mothers. Thus, our results do not speak to the
literature on early childhood educational programs targeting special groups like children
of single mothers, but these are not the central focus of the current policy debate. To
arrive at the TT parameter, we assume equal take up of child care among children included
in and excluded from our sample. In particular, we assume that children of single and
cohabitant parents are as likely to take up the new child care places as children of married
mothers. If the take-up rate is higher (lower) for children excluded from our sample, the
TT parameter will be downward (upward) biased. Unfortunately, we do not have data
on child care use by child and parental characteristics.
The adult outcomes are defined as follows. Years of education of the child is the
number of completed years of education in 2006. Attended college means having at least
13 years of education, while high-school dropout is having no more than 11 years of
education. To measure labor market attachment and welfare dependency, we rely on the
basic amount thresholds of the Norwegian Social Insurance Scheme (used to define labor
market status, determining eligibility for unemployment benefits as well as disability and
old age pension). In 2006, one basic amount is about USD 10,500.8 To account for
non-linearities in the effects on earnings, we use four different earnings measures. An
individual is defined as a low earner if he or she earns less than two basic amounts,
whereas an average earner has at least four basic amounts in earnings. High and top
earners are defined as having at least eight and twelve basic amounts, respectively. Our
8Throughout this paper, all figures are in US dollars, and fixed at 2006-level (NOK/USD = 6.5).
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics: Outcome variables
– Level – – Differences –
Treated Treated – Comparison
Pre-reform Pre-reform Phase-in Post-reform
Years of education 12.65 [2.56] 0.0435 0.0627 0.1180
Attended college 0.3740 [0.4839] 0.0074 0.0138 0.0231
High school dropout 0.2625 [0.4400] -0.0010 -0.0031 -0.0101
Low earner 0.1546 [0.3616] -0.0019 -0.0031 -0.0068
Average earner 0.6929 [0.4613] 0.0067 0.0076 0.0172
High earner 0.1620 [0.3684] 0.0145 0.0149 0.0104
Top earner 0.0417 [0.1999] 0.0066 0.0049 0.0033
On welfare 0.1624 [0.3688] -0.0104 -0.0131 -0.0193
Parent 0.8082 [0.3937] -0.0113 -0.0214 -0.0304
Single, no child 0.1396 [0.3466] 0.0073 0.0112 0.0160
Single, parent 0.0838 [0.2770] -0.0030 -0.0010 -0.0037
No. of children (level) 77,933 – 87,832 74,182 – 83,621 84,052 – 91,406
Notes: Pre-reform cohorts are born 1967–1969, phase-in cohorts are born 1970–1972, and post-reform
cohorts are born 1973–1976. Treatment (comparison) municipalities are above (below) the median in
child care coverage growth from 1976 to 1979. Outcomes are defined in Section 5. Standard deviations
are in brackets.
earnings measure includes wages and income from self-employment. A person is defined as
being on welfare if he or she receives more than one basic amount in public cash transfers.
Finally, individuals are single with no child if they are neither married/cohabitant or
single parent. A person is defined as a single parent if he or she is single and the primary
care giver to a child, whereas individuals are defined as parent if they are in a couple with
children or are single parents.
5.1 Descriptive statistics
Table 2 shows means for our dependent variables. As is evident from the table, there are
modest or no differences in the outcomes of the treatment and comparison group for pre-
reform cohorts. The phase-in cohorts diverge slightly in most variables, while post-reform
cohorts show distinct differences. In a DD framework, this pattern is suggestive of signif-
icant effects of child care on children’s outcomes. Figures A2–A4 in the Appendix graph
the means of all outcomes by child cohort in treatment and comparison municipalities.
We see a good coherence between the time trends of the groups before the reform, and a
substantial change in the relative outcomes after the reform.
Our DD approach identifies the effects of child care by comparing the change in the
outcome of interest before and after the reform of children residing in treatment and
comparison areas. Substantial changes over time in the differences in the observable
characteristics of the two groups may suggest unobserved compositional changes, calling
our empirical strategy into question. Table 3 shows means of our control variables for
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characteristics of the child and the parents. It turns out that the treatment and compari-
son groups have fairly similar characteristics. More importantly, there appears to be small
changes over time in the relative characteristics of the two groups. Table A2 in the Appen-
dix shows DD estimates of equation (1), where we have replaced the dependent variable
with each control variable. With the exception of relocation, the results show small –
and mostly insignificant – differences over time in the characteristics of children residing
in the treatment and comparison areas. If anything, the negative estimates for parents’
education may contribute to downward bias in the estimated child care effects, if parental
education spills over to child outcomes. We have also performed all estimations excluding
all families that relocate between municipalities within the treatment/comparison area.
These estimations yield very similar results.
A concern in applying linear regressions is lack of overlap in the covariate distribution.
As emphasized by Imbens and Wooldridge (2009), this can be assessed by the (scale-
invariant) normalized difference measure. For each covariate, the normalized difference is
defined as the difference in averages by treatment status, scaled by the square root of the
sum of variances. Imbens and Wooldridge suggest as a rule of thumb that linear regression
methods tend to be sensitive to the functional form assumption if the normalized difference
exceeds one quarter. Table 3 displays normalized differences for our controls in curly
brackets, indicating that lack of overlap should be of little concern for the estimated
effects.
Because we control for municipality-specific fixed effects, it is not necessary that the
child care expansion is unrelated to municipality characteristics. It is useful, however, to
understand the determinants of the expansion across municipalities. In the Appendix, we
include a map of Norway, marking the treatment and comparison municipalities in Figure
A1. The map shows that the municipalities are reasonably well spread out, covering urban
and rural municipalities. In our baseline specification, five of the ten largest cities – by
the number of children in our sample – are defined as treatment municipalities (Oslo,
Bergen, Stavanger, Bærum and Fredrikstad), while the others are defined as comparison
municipalities (Trondheim, Kristiansand, Tromsø, Skien and Drammen).
Further, columns 1–4 of table A1 in the Appendix display characteristics of the mu-
nicipalities in the treatment and comparison area. There appears to be no substantial
differences in terms of local government expenditure per capita, in total or on primary
school in particular. The same holds for local government income, consisting largely of
(typically ear marked) grants-in-aid from the central government, local income taxes, and
user fees.9 Interestingly, there are no noticeable differences in the share of female voters
between the municipalities of the treatment and comparison area, nor is there significant
disparity in the socialist shares of voters. Further, there are no substantial differences
9In Norway, the central government determines the tax rate and the tax base of the income tax, and
equalization transfers are designed to be mainly unaffected by local government choices.
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in the population shares of neither 0 to 6 year olds, nor females of fecund age, 19–35 or
36–55 years old.
To examine this issue further, columns 5 and 6 of table A1 include estimates from a
regression of the change in municipality’s child care coverage from 1976 to 1979 on the
characteristics of the municipality. Consistent with the descriptive statistics, there is little
evidence of systematic relationships between the child care expansion and most of these
characteristics. However, there are some notable exceptions. Firstly, the level of child care
coverage in 1976 is negatively correlated with the expansion. It should be noted, however,
that this regressions is not weighed by population size. From Figure 3 we know that
children from treatment and comparison municipalities are exposed to fairly similar level
of child care coverage before the reform. Second, the expansion is positively correlated
with married couples as a share of the population, and with the earnings and education
level of females. This is in line with the suggestion in Havnes and Mogstad (2009), that
child care is made a priority particularly in municipalities with high maternal employment.
We also see that the female share of elected representatives displays the expected positive
relationship with child care expansion. Further, two of the variables indicating rurality
show a small, yet significant, positive correlation with the child care expansion (average
distance to zone center and ear marks per capita). This might be due to the discreteness
of child care expansion; Establishing a typical child care institution increases the child
care coverage rate more in smaller than in larger municipalities. Finally, we see that
after controlling for the share of females among voters, elected representatives and in the
population, female voters and socialist vote share are negatively correlated with the child
care expansion, which may be unexpected. However, it is important to keep in mind that
there was broad bipartisan support for child care expansion in Norway in the 1970s.
6 Main results
Table 4 shows our main results based on equation (1), both per child in the treatment
area denoted by ITT (column 3), and per child care place denoted by TT (column 2).
We focus on the estimated effects per child care place, since these reflect the size of the
child care expansion. To address concerns for selection bias, we estimate equation (1)
with and without the set of controls capturing important child and parental characteris-
tics, as well as municipality-specific fixed effects; Estimates are quite similar across the
different specifications and qualitatively the same. We use as our baseline specifications
the estimations including controls and municipality-specific fixed effects. Nearly all these
estimates are significant at the one percent level. The reform effects for the phase-in
cohorts are relatively small and mostly insignificant.
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics: Control variables
– Level – – Differences –
Treated Treated – Comparison
Pre-reform Pre-reform Phase-in Post-reform
Male 0.5069 -0.0014 0.0036 0.0017
[0.5000] {-0.0020} {0.0051} {0.0024}
No. of older siblings 2.1319 -0.0818 -0.0736 -0.1118
[1.2343] {-0.0456} {-0.0432} {-0.0718}
Mother’s age at 23.3286 0.5671 0.5916 0.6472
first birth [4.0432] {0.1021} {0.1119} {0.1223}
Father’s age at 26.5592 0.4936 0.4867 0.5444
first birth [5.2946] {0.0675} {0.0705} {0.0823}
Mother’s education when 9.6618 0.2805 0.2817 0.3072
child 2 y.o. [2.0739] {0.0987} {0.0992} {0.1066}
Father’s education when 10.3715 0.3730 0.3787 0.4044
child 2 y.o. [2.8162] {0.0971} {0.0995} {0.1065}
Immigrant 0.0566 0.0110 0.0165 0.0162
[0.2311] {0.0355} {0.0535} {0.0534}
Relocated 0.0358 -0.0016 0.0021 0.0070
[0.1858] {-0.0061} {0.0061} {0.0172}
No. of children (level) 77,933 – 87,832 74,182 – 83,621 84,052 – 91,406
Notes: Pre-reform cohorts are born 1967–1969, phase in-cohorts are born 1970–1972, and post-reform
cohorts are born 1973–1976. Treatment (comparison) municipalities are above (below) the median in
child care coverage growth from 1976 to 1979. Control variables are defined in Section 5. Standard
deviations are in square brackets, and normalized differences are in curly brackets.
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6.1 Education
In light of the recent focus on dynamic complementarities in learning, a compelling ques-
tion is how universal child care affects children’s educational attainment. Starting with
these estimations, panel A of Table 4 shows immediately the profound consequences of
universal child care. Our estimated TT effect shows an additional .35 years of educa-
tion per child care place, corresponding to an ITT effect of .06 years per child in the
treatment area. This implies that by facilitating the supply of an additional 17,500 child
care places, local governments were able to produce about 6,200 years of education. The
effect per child care place is comparable to the gap in average education level between the
Netherlands and Greece, or to the difference between the US and Ireland (OECD, 2006).
A vast literature suggests that the return to education is non-linear, with relatively
high returns to high school and college completion.10 We estimate that universal child
care decreases the probability of dropping out of high school by nearly 6 percentage points,
while increasing the probability of attending college by almost 7 percentage points. The
effect on the high school dropout-rate is almost the same as the entire gap between blacks
and whites in the US. Similarly, the effect on college attendance is about two thirds of the
US black–white race gap (US Census, 2007). For a final comparison, in the treatment area,
the gender gaps in high school drop-out and college attendance rates in the pre-reform
cohorts are about 1 and 10 percentage points, respectively.
6.2 Earnings and welfare dependency
Two other important dimensions for evaluating the impact of public policy on long-run
prospects of children are earnings and welfare dependency. In panel B of Table 4, we
report the estimated effects of the child care expansion on the probability of being a low,
average, high and top earner, as well as the probability of being welfare dependent. We
find that the reform reduced the chances of having little or no earnings: Per child care
place, the expansion in universal child care is estimated to decrease the probability of
being a low earner by about 3.6 percentage points. In comparison, the probability of
having at least average earnings increased by 5.1 percentage points.11 Meanwhile, the
effect on high and top earners go in the opposite direction, decreasing the probability
by 3.4 and 2.2 percentage points respectively. It should be noted, however, that the
estimation results for high and top earners are not robust to one of the many specification
tests presented below. With this caveat in mind, the counteracting effects on the top and
the bottom of the earnings distribution suggest that universal child care has an equalizing
effect.
10See for example Trostel (2005) for cross-country evidence on non-linearity in the return to education.
11We have also estimated the effect on the probability of having very low or no earnings (under one
basic amount) to be a decrease of about 6 percentage points (significant at the one percent level).
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Table 4: Main results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
TT ITT SE(ITT) Mean Controls Mun. FE
A. Educational attainment
Years of education 0.4129∗∗∗ 0.0737∗∗∗ 0.0174 12.76 No No
0.2807∗∗∗ 0.0501∗∗∗ 0.0156 12.76 Yes No
0.3523∗∗∗ 0.0629∗∗∗ 0.0155 12.76 Yes Yes
Attended college 0.0868∗∗∗ 0.0155∗∗∗ 0.0034 0.3922 No No
0.0609∗∗∗ 0.0109∗∗∗ 0.0031 0.3922 Yes No
0.0685∗∗∗ 0.0122∗∗∗ 0.0031 0.3922 Yes Yes
High school dropout -0.0498∗∗∗ -0.0089∗∗∗ 0.0029 0.2474 No No
-0.0478∗∗∗ -0.0085∗∗∗ 0.0028 0.2474 Yes No
-0.0584∗∗∗ -0.0104∗∗∗ 0.0028 0.2625 Yes Yes
B. Earnings and welfare dependency
Low earner -0.0281∗∗ -0.0050∗∗ 0.0025 0.1541 No No
-0.0307∗∗ -0.0055∗∗ 0.0025 Yes No
-0.0359∗∗∗ -0.0064∗∗∗ 0.0025 Yes Yes
Average earner 0.0596∗∗∗ 0.0106∗∗∗ 0.0032 0.6888 No No
0.0537∗∗∗ 0.0096∗∗∗ 0.0030 Yes No
0.0514∗∗∗ 0.0092∗∗∗ 0.0031 Yes Yes
High earner -0.0219∗∗ -0.0039∗∗ 0.0023 0.1545 No No
-0.0294∗∗∗ -0.0052∗∗∗ 0.0022 Yes No
-0.0337∗∗∗ -0.0060∗∗∗ 0.0022 Yes Yes
Top earner -0.0183∗∗∗ -0.0033∗∗∗ 0.0011 0.0375 No No
-0.0204∗∗∗ -0.0036∗∗∗ 0.0011 Yes No
-0.0220∗∗∗ -0.0039∗∗∗ 0.0011 Yes Yes
On welfare -0.0496∗∗∗ -0.0089∗∗∗ 0.0025 0.1599 No No
-0.0486∗∗∗ -0.0087∗∗∗ 0.0025 Yes No
-0.0511∗∗∗ -0.0091∗∗∗ 0.0025 Yes Yes
C. Family formation
Parent -0.1029∗∗∗ -0.0184∗∗∗ 0.0030 0.7764 No No
-0.0853∗∗∗ -0.0152∗∗∗ 0.0029 Yes No
-0.0799∗∗∗ -0.0143∗∗∗ 0.0029 Yes Yes
Single, no child 0.0472∗∗∗ 0.0084∗∗∗ 0.0026 0.1506 No No
0.0391∗∗∗ 0.0070∗∗∗ 0.0025 Yes No
0.0347∗∗∗ 0.0062∗∗∗ 0.0025 Yes Yes
Single, parent -0.0036 -0.0007 0.0018 0.0764 No No
-0.0017 -0.0003 0.0017 Yes No
-0.0025 -0.0004 0.0017 Yes Yes
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01 (one-tailed)
Notes: Estimations are based on OLS on equation (1), with and without the controls listed in Table
3. The outcome variables are defined in Section 5. The sample consists of 499,026 children from birth
cohorts 1967–1976. ITT/TT = .1785 (i.e. the increase in child care coverage following the reform in
the treatment group relative to the comparison group). Mean refers to the pre-reform means in the
treatment group. Standard errors are robust to within family clustering and heteroskedasticity.
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For welfare dependency, we find results mirroring those for low and average earnings.
Specifically, the expansion in child care caused a reduction in the probability of being on
welfare by almost 5 percentage points, which is a very large effect when compared to the
pre-reform mean of about 16 percent.
6.3 Family formation
Panel C of Table 4 displays estimates of the effects of the child care expansion on family
formation. We find that the children exposed to the reform are about 8 percentage points
less likely to have a child, and almost 3.5 percentage points more likely to be single with
no child. There is no effect on the probability of being a single parent.
These findings align well with our results on education and earnings: When young
adults undertake more education, child bearing and cohabitation are delayed (Heck et al.,
1997; Buckles, 2008). Whether these effects persist is an open question, but delayed child
birth is often associated with a decrease in the probability of a third or fourth child, since
fecundity weakens when the female ages beyond 30 (Van Noord-Zaadstra et al., 1991).
In end effect, the child care expansion could therefore turn out to lower the fertility rates
and reduce the family size of the exposed children.
7 Specification checks
This section reports results from a battery of specification tests. When considering the
effect of child care on children’s educational attainment, the estimates are fairly similar
across the different specifications and qualitatively the same. This also holds true for most
of the other outcomes, including low earner, average earner, on welfare, parent, and single
no child. In comparison, the results for high earner and top earner are sensitive to one of
the ten specification tests, and should therefore be interpreted with more caution. Table
6 shows the bulk of estimates from our specification checks, while placebo estimates are
reported in Table 5, and Table 7 provides results from estimations including family-specific
fixed effects.
Time trend. Our DD approach identifies the child care effects from the assumption of a
common time trend in the treatment and comparison group in the absence of the reform.
A concern is that our positive effects may reflect differential time trends between the
treatment and comparison municipalities, rather than a true policy impact. In Figure
1, we showed graphically that the pre-reform trends in years of education were quite
similar for the treatment and comparison group, but that there was a striking change in
their relative outcomes after the reform. Figures A2–A4 presented in the Appendix draw
similar pictures for all outcomes.
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Consistent with this evidence, we find no effect of placebo reforms on the outcomes of
children from the pre-reform cohorts who reside in the treatment area. Table 5 reports
results from the placebo test, which turns on the estimated treatment effects for cohorts
born in 1968 and 1969, relative to 1967. If there were differential secular time trends in
the treatment and comparison municipalities, then these effects should be significantly
different from zero. The results show that none of the treatment effects for cohorts born
in 1968 and 1969, is significant at even the 10 percent level. Further, if differential time
trends were to exaggerate the child care estimates, then the signs of the placebo effects
should coincide with the signs of of our main results. On the contrary, Table 5 shows
that about half of the placebo point estimates have the opposite sign of our main results,
indicating, if anything, downward bias in the child care effects on these outcomes.12
To make sure that our results are not driven by secular changes between urban and
rural areas coinciding with the child care reform, we further drop the three big cities
(Oslo, Bergen, and Trondheim) from our analysis. Column (3) in Table 6 reports esti-
mation results excluding these cities, whereas Column (1) repeats our baseline results for
comparison. The fact that our estimates vary little between the specifications increases
our confidence in the empirical strategy.13
As shown by Crump et al. (2009), the propensity score can be used for systematic
sample selection as a precursor to regression estimation, to increase comparability between
treatment and comparison groups. Motivated by this approach, we regress the change in
child care coverage from 1976 to 1979 for the municipalities on a rich set of municipality
characteristics. These estimation results are provided in Table A1 in the Appendix, and
discussed in Section 5. After sorting the municipalities according to the predicted change
in child care coverage, we divide the sample at the 10th and 90th percentiles. Finally, we
estimate our baseline specification on a support sample of children living in municipalities
with predicted child care growth between these threshold. The idea is that the assumption
of a common time trend may be more plausible if there is stronger overlap in the covariate
distribution between the treatment and control municipalities. Column (8) in Table 6
reports estimates from this support sample, which conform well to the results from the
baseline specification. Given the smaller sample size, it is not surprising to find that
the estimates from the support sample are less precise, though generally significant at
conventional levels and not significantly different from the baseline specification.14
Besley and Burgess (2004) show that allowing for differential time trends between ar-
eas in a DD regression may kill otherwise significant and large treatment effects. Column
12We have also estimated equation (1) replacing the indicators for pre-reform, phase-in, and post-reform
cohorts with cohort-specific dummies. Also in this case, the placebo reform effects are insignificant.
Moreover, the treatment effect are fairly similar across different post-reform cohorts.
13We have also dropped the six largest cities from our analysis, yielding very similar results.
14As an alternative, we have estimated the probability that a municipality is a treatment municipality.
Estimating the baseline specification on the sample of children from municipalities with a predicted
probability of treatment of at least 10 percent but not more than 90 percent, yields very similar results.
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Table 5: Robustness: Placebo reform.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
TT 1968 TT 1969 TT Phase-in TT Post Mean
Years of education -0.0009 -0.0506 0.0913 0.3349∗∗∗ 12.76
(0.1520) (0.1512) (0.1243) (0.1238)
Attended college 0.0057 -0.0261 0.0268 0.0616∗∗∗ 0.3922
(0.0295) (0.0294) (0.0243) (0.0243)
High school dropout -0.0167 -0.0031 -0.0236 -0.0650∗∗∗ 0.2474
(0.0284) (0.0281) (0.0231) (0.0228)
Low earner -0.0013 -0.0155 -0.0148 -0.0416∗∗ 0.1541
(0.0241) (0.0240) (0.0198) (0.0198)
Average earner -0.0087 0.0250 0.0041 0.0570∗∗∗ 0.6888
(0.0295) (0.0294) (0.0243) (0.0243)
High earner 0.0156 0.0274 0.0097 -0.0192 0.1545
(0.0233) (0.0231) (0.0190) (0.0185)
Top earner -0.0133 -0.0058 -0.0177∗∗ -0.0284∗∗∗ 0.0375
(0.0130) (0.0127) (0.0104) (0.0099)
On welfare 0.0264 0.0258 0.0022 -0.0336∗∗ 0.1599
(0.0246) (0.0244) (0.0202) (0.0199)
Parent 0.0161 -0.0093 -0.0421∗∗ -0.0777∗∗∗ 0.7764
(0.0256) (0.0259) (0.0216) (0.0221)
Single, no child -0.0188 -0.0229 0.0012 0.0207 0.1506
(0.0228) (0.0229) (0.0191) (0.0194)
Single, parent 0.0167 0.0138 0.0235∗ 0.0078 0.0764
(0.0189) (0.0186) (0.0153) (0.0149)
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01 (one-tailed)
Notes: Estimations are based on OLS on equation (1), including all controls from Table
3 and municipal-specific fixed effects. The 1967-cohort is the omitted reference cate-
gory. The outcome variables are defined in Section 5. Reported treatment effects are
per child care place (TT parameter); ITT/TT = .1785 (i.e. the increase in child care
coverage following the reform in the treatment group relative to the comparison group).
The sample consists of 499,026 children from the birth cohorts 1967–1976. Pre-reform
cohorts are born 1967–1969, phase-in-cohorts are born 1970–1972, and post-reform co-
horts are born 1973–1976. Standard errors in parentheses are robust to within family
clustering and heteroskedasticity.
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5 in Table 6 reports estimation results where we have added municipality-specific time
trends to our baseline specification. The idea is to use the pre-reform data to extrapolate
the time trend of each municipality into the post-reform period. This allows treatment
and comparison municipalities to follow different secular trends in a limited but poten-
tially revealing way. As expected, the estimates are less precise, as we now exploit the
deviations from preexisting municipality-specific trends to pin down the child care ef-
fects. However, it’s heartening to find that the results including municipal-specific trends
in general support the picture from our baseline specification; The estimated effects are
higher for some outcomes, like years of education, and lower for others, such as high-
school dropout. The exceptions are the results for high earner and top earner, where the
estimates are substantially affected by the inclusion of municipality-specific time trends.
Clustering. To account for the fact that the variation in the data we use to estimate
the child care effects is at the municipality-period level, Column (2) in Table 6 reports
results from our baseline specification, clustering the standard errors at the municipality–
period level. By doing so, we allow for shocks common to children who are born in the
same period and live in the same municipality. We find that accounting for dependence
within municipality–period groups does not increase our standard errors much, and the
significance levels of the results are very similar.15
Selective migration. Although location decisions based on unobservable characteristics
may affect our estimates, the direction of the bias is not obvious. On the one hand,
education-oriented or labor market attached parents may be more likely to move to mu-
nicipalities with high child care coverage rate. On the other hand, parents with children
who need special attention or supervision may be more inclined to move to municipal-
ities with good access to child care. Though recent empirical work finds little support
for Tiebout sorting across states or municipalities according to public good provision like
school quality,16 we take several steps to avoid that selective migration of families into
treatment and comparison municipalities confounds our results.
To address the concern for in-migration induced by the reform, we excluded in our
main analysis children from families that move between treatment and comparison mu-
nicipalities during the expansion period. In addition, we control for relocation between
municipalities within the treatment/comparison area; We have also performed all estima-
tions excluding families that relocate, and the results are unchanged. However, one could
argue that even the sample of stayers is selective, as out-migration could be endogenous
15Bertrand et al. (2004) show that the standard errors in DD regressions may be misstated if there
is serial correlation in the municipality-period shocks. As their analysis demonstrates, we reduce the
problem of serial correlation considerably by collapsing the time-series dimension into three periods:
pre-reform, phase-in, and post-reform.
16See e.g. Rhode and Strumpf (2003) who find little support for Tiebout sorting across municipalities
and counties using about 150 years of data.
26
to the child care expansion. To address this issue, we follow Hægeland et al. (2008) in
using children’s municipality of birth to determine whether they belong to treatment or
comparison municipalities. Column (4) in Table 6 shows that the effects of the child care
expansion is robust to using municipality of birth to determine treatment status. This
finding conforms well with the results from Hægeland et al. (2008), which suggest that
school quality matters little, if anything, for location decisions in Norway.
Alternative treatment definitions. In our baseline specification, we define the treatment
and comparison areas by ordering municipalities according to the increase in child care
coverage rate in the period 1976–1979, and then separating them at the median. Below,
we make sure that our results are not artifacts of this choice of treatment definition.
In Column (6), we use the same expansion period, 1976–1979, but divide the sample
at the 33rd and 67th percentiles of child care growth. Municipalities below the lower
threshold are in the comparison group, while those above the upper threshold are in the
treatment group. Children from municipalities in between the thresholds are excluded
from the sample used for estimation. In column (7), we define the treatment and com-
parison according to the median child care growth, but alter the expansion period to
1977–1979. To be consistent with this new definition of the expansion period, the 1970
cohort is now defined as a pre-reform instead of a phase-in cohort. Our findings show
that the child care effects are similar across treatment definitions: The estimated effects
are generally statistically significant at conventional levels and not significantly different
from our baseline specification.17
17We have also considered expansion periods 1976–1978, 1977–1980, and 1978–1980. For all expansion
periods, we have used both thresholds: the median and 33rd vs. 67th percentile. The results confirm the
picture presented above.
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To get round the issue of how to draw the line between treatment and comparison
municipalities we estimate equation (2), where child outcome is regressed on child care
coverage in each municipality, controlling for cohort and municipality-specific fixed effects
as well as a set of controls. Column (9) reports estimates from this regression. In line with
the results from the baseline specification, the findings suggest that child care had positive
effects on educational attainment, labor market attachment, and welfare dependency.
Although not significantly different, the point estimates for educational attainment are
considerably lower with the specification that is linear in child care coverage, relative to
our baseline specification. For instance, whereas the baseline specification estimates the
reform effects per child care place to be .35 years of education, the linear specification
suggests that creating another child care slot increases years of education of a child by
.15. It should be noted, however, that adding a quadratic term in child care coverage to
equation (2) gives results for educational attainment that are very similar to our baseline
specification. Specifically, our quadratic specification predicts that the rise in child care
coverage from 1976 to 1979 of 17.85 percentage points led to increases per child care place
of .39 for years of education and 6.5 percentage points for college attendance, whereas
high-school drop-out rates reduce by 6 percentage points (all significant at a one percent
level).
Family-specific fixed effects. In this final specification test, we take advantage of the
fact that we can link all children to their parents through unique individual identifiers.
This allows us to identify siblings, and add family-specific fixed effects controlling for
unobserved time-invariant family characteristics. The reform effects are then identified
only from comparisons of the outcomes of siblings from the pre-reform and the post-reform
cohorts, who have the same family background but experience different exposure to child
care. A notable feature is that these children have a sibling that is at least three years
apart. This implies that children born late among the post-reform cohorts, when the
child care coverage rate was highest, will be undersampled.18 Consequently, to compare
the family-fixed effect results with our main results would be inappropriate. Instead, we
restrict our sample to children from families with siblings from at least two of the three
groups of cohorts; pre-reform, phase-in, and postreform.19 Next, we estimate equation (1)
on this subsample, with and without family-specific fixed effects. The results are reported
in Table 7, and show that the reform effects are, as expected, generally smaller and less
precisely estimated in this subsample. More importantly, comparing the results with and
without family-specific fixed effects increases our confidence in the empirical strategy,
since the point estimates are quite similar, and never significantly different. It should be
18Notice that a child born in 1976, say, must have a sibling at least 7 years his senior (born in 1969,
and therefore in the pre-reform cohorts) to be included in this sample.
19To gain efficiency, we include the phase-in cohorts, but they will not contribute to identifying the
child care effects.
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noted that when estimating the effects in subsamples by mother’s education and child
sex, as below, we do find large child care effects. For example, when considering children
with low educated mothers, the family-fixed effect specification produces estimates that
are very close to the results from our main specification.
8 Heterogeneous effects of child care
Our main results show strong positive effects of child care on children’s long-run outcomes,
raising educational attainment, strengthening labor market attachment, and lifting people
out of welfare dependency. However, estimating the average effect for the treatment group
as a whole may conceal important differences in the consequences of the reform across
subgroups. For instance, Melhuish et al. (2004, 2008) suggest that girls and children with
low educated parents benefit most from child care attendance. To address this question,
we estimate our model for different subsamples.
In Table 8, we report results from subsamples divided by the child’s sex (columns 2
and 3) and by the mother’s education (columns 4 and 5). Column 1 repeats our baseline
estimates for ease of comparison. Considering first the estimated effects by the child’s sex,
we find that most, if not all, of the reduction in the probability of being low and average
earners relates to girls. This indicates that universal child care may contribute to closing
the gender wage gap. Interestingly, the subsample results also reveal that it is mostly
girls who delay child bearing and family formation as adults when exposed to child care.
When it comes to mother’s education, we find that most of the benefits associated with
universal child care relate to children of low educated mothers. The child care reform
could therefore be expected to increase intergenerational mobility.20
Like in Baker et al. (2008), it can be difficult to interpret the differences in our
estimates across subpopulations because there could both be differences in child care
take-up and potentially heterogenous impacts of uptake. Unfortunately, we do not have
data on child care use by child and parental characteristics. The results in this section
therefore assume the same take-up rate across the subpopulations. This is admittedly a
strong assumption, and we should have this caveat in mind when interpreting the above
subsample results. However, when it comes to child’s sex the assumption may be less
controversial as child care institutions sought to balance the composition of children.
When considering mother’s education, it is perhaps most likely that we underestimate
the reform effects on children with low educated mothers, since high educated married
mothers are more attached to the labor market and should therefore be more likely to use
child care.
20We have also estimated the model separately by number of siblings, parents’ age, mother’s labor
market attachment, and father’s education. We generally find small differences across the subsamples,
although the estimates are often more imprecise.
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Table 7: Family-specific fixed effects: Education and earnings
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
TT ITT SE(ITT) Controls Fam. FE
Years of education 0.1538 0.0275 0.0229 No No
0.1870∗ 0.0334∗ 0.0208 Yes No
0.1685∗ 0.0301∗ 0.0231 Yes Yes
Attended college 0.0404∗ 0.0072∗ 0.0045 No No
0.0444∗∗ 0.0079∗∗ 0.0041 Yes No
0.0530∗∗ 0.0095∗∗ 0.0047 Yes Yes
High school dropout -0.0161 -0.0029 0.0040 No No
-0.0255 -0.0045 0.0038 Yes No
-0.0197 -0.0035 0.0044 Yes Yes
Low earner -0.0151 -0.0027 0.0035 No No
-0.0157 -0.0028 0.0034 Yes No
-0.0114 -0.0020 0.0041 Yes Yes
Average earner 0.0496∗∗ 0.0089∗∗ 0.0044 No No
0.0406∗∗ 0.0073∗∗ 0.0042 Yes No
0.0396∗ 0.0071∗ 0.0050 Yes Yes
High earner -0.0058 -0.0010 0.0032 No No
-0.0109 -0.0020 0.0030 Yes No
-0.0079 -0.0014 0.0036 Yes Yes
Top earner -0.0274∗∗∗ -0.0049∗∗∗ 0.0016 No No
-0.0284∗∗∗ -0.0051∗∗∗ 0.0016 Yes No
-0.0220∗∗ -0.0039∗∗ 0.0019 Yes Yes
On welfare -0.0448∗∗ -0.0080∗∗ 0.0035 No No
-0.0454∗∗∗ -0.0081∗∗∗ 0.0034 Yes No
-0.0256 -0.0046 0.0041 Yes Yes
Parent -0.0836∗∗∗ -0.0149∗∗∗ 0.0041 No No
-0.0741∗∗∗ -0.0132∗∗∗ 0.0040 Yes No
-0.0665∗∗∗ -0.0119∗∗∗ 0.0048 Yes Yes
Single, no child 0.0379∗∗ 0.0068∗∗ 0.0035 No No
0.0315∗ 0.0056∗ 0.0035 Yes No
0.0486∗∗ 0.0087∗∗ 0.0042 Yes Yes
Single, parent -0.0015 -0.0003 0.0024 No No
0.0001 0.0000 0.0024 Yes No
0.0020 0.0004 0.0029 Yes Yes
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01 (one-tailed)
Notes: Estimations are based on OLS on equation (1), with and without controls and
family-specific fixed effects. The controls are listed in Table 3. The outcomes variable
are defined in Section 5. The sample consists of 286,835 children from birth cohorts
1967–1976, who belong to families with siblings from at least two of the three groups
of cohorts: pre-reform, phase-in group, and post-reform. Mean refers to the pre-reform
means in the treatment group. ITT/TT = .1785 (i.e. the increase in child care cov-
erage following the reform in the treatment group relative to the comparison group).
Standard errors are robust to within family clustering and heteroskedasticity.
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Table 8: Subsample results by gender and mother’s education
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
– Child sex – – Mother’s education –
Full sample Boys Girls High school Not high school
Years of education 0.3523∗∗∗ 0.3801∗∗∗ 0.3208∗∗∗ 0.1161 0.4188∗∗∗
(0.0871) (0.1204) (0.1251) (0.2102) (0.0960)
Attended college 0.0685∗∗∗ 0.0690∗∗∗ 0.0676∗∗∗ 0.0184 0.0779∗∗∗
(0.0172) (0.0235) (0.0251) (0.0392) (0.0194)
High school dropout -0.0584∗∗∗ -0.0696∗∗∗ -0.0452∗∗ -0.0118 -0.0712∗∗∗
(0.0155) (0.0219) (0.0218) (0.0251) (0.0185)
Low earner 0.0359∗∗∗ 0.0019 0.0696∗∗∗ 0.0479∗∗ 0.0386∗∗∗
(0.0139) (0.0170) (0.0222) (0.0291) (0.0159)
Average earner 0.0514∗∗∗ 0.0175 0.0844∗∗∗ 0.0314 0.0648∗∗∗
(0.0171) (0.0210) (0.0269) (0.0370) (0.0194)
High earner -0.0337∗∗∗ -0.0256 -0.0441∗∗∗ -0.0451∗ -0.0153
(0.0124) (0.0216) (0.0113) (0.0336) (0.0132)
Top earner -0.0220∗∗∗ -0.0227∗∗ -0.0222∗∗∗ -0.0320∗ -0.0108∗∗
(0.0064) (0.0116) (0.0049) (0.0198) (0.0064)
On welfare -0.0511∗∗∗ -0.0352∗∗ -0.0657∗∗∗ -0.0694∗∗∗ -0.0468∗∗∗
(0.0137) (0.0156) (0.0228) (0.0274) (0.0159)
Parent -0.0799∗∗∗ -0.0487∗∗ -0.1141∗∗∗ -0.0702∗∗ -0.0618∗∗∗
(0.0165) (0.0248) (0.0216) (0.0380) (0.0185)
Single, no child 0.0347∗∗∗ 0.0171 0.0532∗∗∗ 0.0129 0.0315∗∗
(0.0142) (0.0225) (0.0172) (0.0332) (0.0158)
Single, parent -0.0025 0.0120 -0.0175 -0.0344∗∗ 0.0065
(0.0097) (0.0099) (0.0168) (0.0203) (0.0112)
No. of children 499,026 253,752 245,274 101,879 397,147
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01 (one-tailed)
Estimations are based on OLS on equation (1) separately for each subsample, with controls listed in
Table 3 and municipal-specific fixed effects. Each entry reports the treatment effect per child care
place (TT parameter) for the subsample assuming equal take-up of the child care places created by
the reform; ITT/TT = .1785 (i.e. the increase in child care coverage following the reform in the
treatment group relative to the comparison group). Outcomes are defined in Section 5. Standard
errors in parentheses are robust to within family clustering and heteroskedasticity.
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9 Mechanisms
In this section, we take a closer look at the mechanisms behind our results. We first focus
on how the counterfactual mode of child care might influence our results. Next, we turn
our attention to other possible mechanisms, before discussing how effects on children not
attending child care may matter for the interpretation of the TT parameter. Finally, we
consider the financial costs and benefits associated with the child care expansion.
9.1 Maternal employment
When interpreting our estimated effects of universal child care, a crucial point is the
counterfactual mode of care, i.e. the type of care the children would be exposed to in the
absence of the reform. There are two distinct counterfactual modes of care. The first is
parental care, while the second is informal care, including relatives, unlicensed care givers,
and other irregular care givers such as friends and neighbors. A shift from parental care
to formal child care could affect children differently than a shift from informal care, which
is likely to be of inferior quality (Gupta and Simonsen, 2007).
Havnes and Mogstad (2009) estimate the effect of the child care reform on the employ-
ment and earnings of married mothers. To this end, a DD approach is used, comparing
the growth rate in employment of mothers with the youngest child aged 3 to 6 years liv-
ing in municipalities where child care coverage expanded a lot (i.e. the treatment group),
with the growth rate for mothers with the youngest child of the same age who live in mu-
nicipalities with little or no increase in child care (i.e. the comparison group). The main
results of the analysis can be seen in Figure 5, showing child care coverage and maternal
employment rates in Norway before and after the child care reform. Whereas the graph
of the child care coverage rate in the treatment group kinks heavily after the reform,
the graphs of employment rates in the treatment and comparison groups move almost in
parallel. Consistent with this evidence, the estimation results reported by Havnes and
Mogstad (2009) provide strong and robust evidence that the new subsidized child care
crowds out informal care arrangements, with almost no net increase in total care use,
employment or earnings.21
As our sample differs somewhat from theirs, we re-examine the reform effect on ma-
ternal employment.22 The precise DD results presented in Table 9 conform to Havnes
and Mogstad (2009), in finding a .04 percentage point increase in maternal employment
21A battery of specification checks support the results, including a placebo reform, the inclusion and
exclusion of a rich set of controls, a triple-difference approach using mothers of 7–10 year olds as a
second comparison group, and the inclusion of individual-specific and municipality-specific fixed effects.
Moreover, their subsample analysis, estimating the model separately by education and age, shows no
effect on maternal labor supply for these subgroups. In addition, Leira (1992) reports survey results
suggesting that the number of non-working mothers using child care did not increase over the period
1973–1985.
22We estimate the following regression model by OLS, with controls listed in Table 3 and municipality-
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Figure 5: Child care coverage rates for children 3-6 by treatment (solid) and comparison
group (dash) and employment rate for mothers of 3-6 y.o (diamonds) vs mothers of 7-10
y.o. (circles)
Source: Havnes and Mogstad (2009).
per percentage point increase in the child care coverage rate. This implies that the new
child care slots were associated with a 96 percent crowding out of informal care. Conse-
quently, our positive results of child care on children’s outcomes should be interpreted as
reflecting a shift from informal rather than parental care. By contrast, it is not clear how
to interpret the negative effects reported in Baker et al. (2008), since they find evidence
both of a shift from parental care into new child care, and of crowding out of informal
care.
The shift from informal to formal care seems relevant for policy debates about univer-
sally accessible child care also in other countries. Cascio (2009) and Lundin, Mörk and
Öckert (2008) find no effect on maternal labor supply for married mothers in the US and
Sweden, respectively, from increased access to subsidized child care. Also, while Gelbach
(2002), Berlinski and Galiani (2007) and Baker et al. (2008) find that subsidized child
care has a positive effect on maternal labor supply, they all find considerable crowding
out of informal care arrangements.
specific fixed effects:
Yjt = γ0 + γ1Treatedj + γ2(Treatedj × Phaseint) + θ(Treatedj × Postt)
+ ψ1Phaseint + ψ2Postt +X ′jtβ + jt,
where Yjt is equal to 1 if mother j works when her child is between 3 and 6 years old (and 0 otherwise). The
dummy variable Treatedj is equal to 1 if mother j lives in a treatment municipality, whereas Phaseint
and Postt are dummy variables equal to 1 when the observation is from phase-in cohorts and post-reform
cohorts, respectively. If a mother has more than one child from either the pre-reform, the phase-in or the
post-reform cohorts, we consider the youngest child only.
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Table 9: Mechanisms: Family size, mother’s education and maternal employment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
TT ITT SE(ITT) Mean
Family size 0.1003∗∗∗ 0.0179∗∗∗ 0.0060 2.995
Mother’s education -0.0051 -0.0009 0.0061 10.15
Maternal employment
– Low earner -0.0431∗∗∗ -0.0077∗∗∗ 0.0025 0.1190
– Average earner 0.0443∗∗∗ 0.0079∗∗∗ 0.0015 0.0373
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01 (one-tailed)
Notes: The sample consists of 318,367 mothers of the 499,026 children from cohorts born in 1967–1976.
ITT/TT = .1785 (i.e. the increase in child care coverage following the reform in the treatment group
relative to the comparison group). Standard errors are clustered on the mother. Maternal employment:
Maternal employment status is determined based on average earnings over the years the child is be-
tween 3 and 6 years old. Estimations are based on OLS on the equation in footnote 22. Family size and
mother’s education: Estimations are based on OLS on equation (1), with controls listed in Table 3 and
municipal-specific fixed effects. Mother’s education is measured when the child is 16 years old. Family
size is measured in 2006. Standard errors are robust to within family clustering and heteroskedasticity.
9.2 Other possible mechanisms
A concern for the interpretation of the estimated reform effect is that the child care
expansion could be associated with changes in the quality of formal care. If the quality of
child care institutions improved in the treatment municipalities relative to the comparison
municipalities, we could potentially overstate the impact of the new child care places.
However, there is no evidence of such quality changes over this period. Considering Table
10, it seems that, if anything, the quality of formal child care may have deteriorated
somewhat in the treatment group compared to the comparison group: From 1975 to 1979,
the number of children per teacher increased somewhat in the treatment group from just
under 17 to about 19 children, while the opposite was true in the comparison group, with
a decrease from about 19 to just over 17 children per teacher. The same holds true for the
number of children per employee, where the difference between the groups shifted about
two points in favor of the comparison group from 1975 to 1979. Unfortunately, we do not
have data on other aspects of child care quality. In any case, Blau (1999b) shows that
child care characteristics, such as group size, staff-child ratio, and employee training, have
little association with child development.
The fact that the reform had little impact on maternal employment also means that it
is unlikely that increased family income is the driving factor behind the positive effects.
The child care subsidies could be interpreted as a modest increase in family income,
depending on the costs associated with alternative modes of care. However, Gulbrandsen
et al. (1982) report small differences in the price of formal child care and unlicensed care
givers in Norway. In any case, most studies find little, if any, causal effect of family income
on children’s outcomes (Blau, 1999a).
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Table 10: Descriptive statistics: Quality of child care
1973 1975 1977 1979 1981
Treatment
Children/teacher 8.93 16.67 18.78 19.18 18.12
Children/employee 4.18 6.80 8.48 9.43 8.99
No. of institutions 422 520 988 1,582 1,794
Comparison
Children/teacher 11.45 18.82 17.40 17.69 17.52
Children/employee 4.63 7.49 7.49 8.13 8.32
No. of institutions 262 360 481 712 960
Another possible mechanism behind our results is that the access to child care made
it easier for mothers to undertake education, which may spill over to child outcomes. We
examine this mechanism by estimating the baseline specification of equation (1), with
mother’s years of education when the child is 16 years old as the dependent variable. As
shown in Table 9, the reform had no impact on mother’s education. In any case, Black
et al. (2005b) find little evidence of a causal relationship between parents’ education
and children’s education in Norway. Consequently, we can rule out intergenerational
transmission of education as an important mechanism behind the positive effects of the
child care reform.
Finally, we consider the impact of the child care expansion on family size. The well-
known quantity-quality model of fertility introduced by Becker and Lewis (1973) sug-
gests that greater family size negatively affects parents’ investments in child development
through resource dilution. If increased access to child care promotes larger families, then
the reform may reduce children’s human capital, offsetting the positive effects of actual
child care attendance. To investigate this, we estimate the baseline specification of equa-
tion (1), replacing child outcome with completed family size (measured in 2006) as the
dependent variable. Table 9 shows that the child care expansion caused a modest .1
increase in family size per child care place. Moreover, Black et al. (2005a), using data
from Norway, suggest no causal effect of family size on children’s adult outcomes, despite
a strong correlation. This implies that changes in family size are of little concern for the
interpretation of our results.
9.3 Children not in child care
Above, we have reported both ITT and TT estimates. An advantage of the ITT parameter
is that it captures the full reform impact on changes in both formal and informal care
arrangements as well as peer effects on children who were not attending child care. In
comparison, the TT parameter gives us the effect of child care exposure per child care
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place, reflecting the size of the reform. However, if children who were not in child care
were also affected by the reform, we need to be cautious about interpreting the TT effects
as the consequences of actual child care attendance.
There are at least two different channels through which children who were not attend-
ing child care may be affected by the reform. First, a shift from informal to formal child
care could reduce the price and increase the access to informal care arrangements. In
consequence, there might be a switch from parental to informal care, which is presumably
of inferior quality. In that case, our TT effects are biased downwards.
A second channel is peer effects: The effects of child care attendance may indirectly
affect children who were not in child care, e.g. through classroom behavior in school. If
the peer effects are positive, the TT parameter may overstate the impact of actual child
care use. In that case, the reform benefitted not only the children who attended child
care, but also their peers. As shown below, allowing for peer effects is likely to have little
bite against interpreting the TT estimates as the effects of child care attendance.
Let ∆CC denote the growth in child care coverage following the reform in the treat-
ment group relative to the comparison group. The full reform impact, given by ITT,
consists of the average effect on the new users of child care (T˜ T ), with population share
∆CC = .178, and the average peer effect (A) on the other children:
ITT = T˜ T ×∆CC + A× (1−∆CC).
The literature suggests small peer effects in school, if any at all.23 Applying the esti-
mates from Hanushek et al. (2003) of .05 standard deviations in educational attainment, A
is equal to .05T˜ T times the standard deviation of the outcome. Taking years of education
as an example with a standard deviation of 2.56, and solving from the equation above,
the T˜ T parameter is about .22 years of education. In comparison, the TT parameter
assuming no peer effects was .35 years of education.
If all children who do not attend child care benefit as much as children in child care
(i.e. A = T˜ T ) then T˜ T is of course equal to ITT. This would imply that creating one
child care slot had the same total effect as providing full coverage.
9.4 Costs and benefits
Though a full-fledged cost–benefit-analysis is beyond the scope of this paper, some back-of-
the-envelope calculations suggests that the child care expansion produced high pecuniary
returns to the children, and that it was cost-effective relative to other types of public
investments in child development.
23See for example Angrist and Lang (2004) and Cullen et al. (2006).
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Costs. In the Kindergarten White Paper (NOU, 1972), the government estimated
the annual budgetary cost per child care place to about USD 5,400. This gives a total
cost of just over USD 21,000 for the four years considered. In addition, investment costs
are estimated to be about USD 12,000 per child care place, adding about USD 1,200
to the annual cost if written down over ten years. Compared to other types of public
investments in child development, child care seems to be a comparatively inexpensive
alternative. Using exogenous variation in tax revenues, Hægeland et al. (2008) estimate
that an increase in annual spending of USD 1500 per pupil in primary school would
raise test scores by only about 0.2 standard deviations. Meanwhile, in 2006, the annual
municipal expenditure per pupil in primary and lower secondary school was about USD
11,000 (Statistics Norway: Municipal accounting statistics, 2007).
Benefits. It is difficult to assess the pecuniary returns over the children’s lifetime to
the child care reform, but as an indication we use our baseline estimate to derive the
expected returns to education. In Norway, the average return on earnings per completed
year of education is about five percent, while payoffs to high school completion and college
attendance are about nine and 23 percent respectively (Hægeland et al., 1999). We further
use average annual wages from 2006 of USD 56,000 and assume a working life of 40 years
and a real interest rate of two percent. Our baseline estimate of .35 years of education
per child care place then implies an increase in annual earnings of just under USD 1,000
per year or an increase in life time earnings of about USD 27,000. In comparison, college
attendance implies an increase in earnings of over USD 13,000 annually, or almost USD
370,000 in lifetime earnings for these children. Since child care is estimated to lift about
seven percent of the population into college attendance, this gives a payoff of about USD
25,000 per additional child care place. Similarly, the effect on high school completion
indicates an effect of about USD 5,000 annually, or USD 145,000 in lifetime earnings,
implying an effect of just over USD 8,000 per child care place. If completing high school
or attending college affects the probability of additional schooling, then the effects are
even stronger.
10 Conclusion
There is a heated debate in the US and Canada, as well as in many European countries,
about a move towards subsidized, universally accessible child care or preschool. This con-
troversy has been fuelled by a number of studies showing that early educational programs
can generate learning gains in the short-run and, in many cases, improve the long-run
prospects of children from poor families (see e.g. Karoly et al., 2005). While the results
from these studies are encouraging, the programs evaluated were unusually intensive and
involve small numbers of particularly disadvantaged children from a few cities in the US.
A major concern is therefore that this evidence may tell us little about the effects of uni-
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versal child care systems, offered to the entire population (Baker et al., 2008). This paper
contributes by providing first evidence of the impact of universal child care on children’s
long-run outcomes.
Specifically, we analyze the introduction of subsidized, universally accessible child care
in Norway, examining the impact on the adult outcomes of children with married mothers.
Our precise and robust difference-in-difference estimates show that child care exposure
improves the long-run prospects of children considerably. This is true with regard to both
educational attainment and labor market attachment, as well as welfare dependency. In
aggregate terms, the additional 17,500 child care places produced 6,200 years of education.
The child care expansion also raised the chances of completing high school and attending
college, in orders of magnitude similar to the black–white race gaps in the US. Consistent
with the evidence of higher education and stronger labor market attachment, we also find
that children exposed to child care delayed child bearing and family formation as adults.
Our subsample analysis indicates that most the effect on education stems from children
with low educated mothers, whereas most of the effect on earnings relates to girls. This
suggests that good access to subsidized child care levels the playing field by increasing
intergenerational mobility and closing the gender wage gap.
Whether these positive findings for Norway would extend to other countries is an open
question. However, the Scandinavian countries were the first to introduce universally
accessible child care, and their experience is currently a unique – and perhaps the only –
source of information about the long-run consequences of universal child care.
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Appendix
Figure A1: Geographic location of treatment (white) and comparison (dark) municipali-
ties
(a) Years of education (b) Attended college
(c) High school dropout (d) On welfare
Figure A2: Unconditional cohort means for education and welfare dependency for cohorts
born 1967–1976 by treatment and comparison group
(a) Low earner (b) Average earner
(c) High earner (d) Top earner
Figure A3: Unconditional cohort means for earnings for cohorts born 1967–1976 by treat-
ment and comparison group
(a) Parent (b) Single, parent
(c) Single, no child
Figure A4: Unconditional cohort means for cohorts born 1967–1976 by treatment and
comparison group
Table A1: Descriptive statistics for treatment and comparison municipalities in
1976
Treatment Comparison Regression
Child care coverage rate 0.0534 [0.0899] 0.0695 [0.0968] -0.2643∗∗∗ (0.0834)
Years of education, males 9.2256 [0.5514] 9.2174 [0.4699] 0.0558 (0.0569)
–, females 8.8198 [0.3820] 8.7672 [0.3313] 0.1084∗ (0.0844)
Earnings, males 0.3917 [0.0762] 0.4081 [0.0734] -1.0558∗∗ (0.5475)
–, females 0.1080 [0.0349] 0.1121 [0.0321] 1.9675∗ (1.4392)
Labor force part., males 0.8324 [0.0591] 0.8367 [0.0665] 0.2489 (0.4234)
–, females 0.2919 [0.0844] 0.2997 [0.0813] -0.5789 (0.5431)
–, mothers of 3–6 year olds 0.1903 [0.0753] 0.1953 [0.0710] 0.0203 (0.2527)
Expenditure (1000 NOK/capita)
Total 6.2377 [1.8918] 5.9132 [1.4921] -0.0074 (0.0106)
Primary school 1.5716 [0.6981] 1.4521 [0.5904] 0.0140 (0.0161)
Revenue (1000 NOK/capita)
Ear marks, total 3.702 [1.4167] 3.5522 [1.1317] 0.0267∗∗ (0.0135)
–, primary school 0.5706 [0.2165] 0.5684 [0.2348] -0.1595∗ (0.1020)
Fees, total 0.8102 [0.5852] 0.6826 [0.4147] 0.0126 (0.0238)
–, primary school 0.0056 [0.0090] 0.0063 [0.0117] -0.2391 (0.8371)
Taxes 2.4635 [0.6825] 2.4641 [0.7459] -0.0215 (0.0222)
Geography
In densely populated areas 0.4049 [0.2915] 0.4827 [0.2979] -0.0708 (0.0606)
Ave. distance to zone center 0.8876 [0.7789] 0.7732 [0.6788] 0.0368∗∗ (0.0177)
– to neighboring center 3.7768 [2.6130] 3.4297 [2.8039] -0.0022 (0.0069)
Population
Total 9846 [36400] 9476 [13267] -0.0000 (0.0000)
Married 0.4664 [0.0277] 0.4618 [0.0346] 1.2785∗∗ (0.5824)
Divorced 0.0144 [0.0081] 0.0153 [0.0080] 1.3476 (1.6947)
Immigrant 0.0098 [0.0096] 0.0095 [0.0086] 0.4559 (1.0705)
0 to 6 years old 0.1077 [0.0177] 0.1141 [0.0177] -0.2208 (1.4109)
7 to 10 years old 0.0673 [0.0099] 0.0708 [0.0097] -0.4974 (1.7386)
11 to 18 years old 0.1293 [0.0127] 0.1314 [0.0133] -0.2054 (1.2713)
Females: 19 to 35 years old 0.1021 [0.0187] 0.1082 [0.0170] -0.8752 (1.7315)
–: 36 to 55 years old 0.1027 [0.0101] 0.1019 [0.0095] -1.9079 (2.2257)
Males: 19 to 35 years old 0.1175 [0.0152] 0.1227 [0.0137] -0.6754 (1.8856)
–: 36 to 55 years old 0.1096 [0.0091] 0.1077 [0.0092] 1.3530 (1.9512)
Politics
Registered voters 6480 [26654] 5863 [8488] 0.0000 (0.0000)
–, female 0.4896 [0.0169] 0.4928 [0.0167] -3.5556∗∗∗ (1.1348)
Election participation 0.7243 [0.0587] 0.7093 [0.0563] 0.5170 (0.5946)
–, females 0.7094 [0.0666] 0.6962 [0.0632] -0.4053 (0.5120)
Female elected representatives 0.1521 [0.0807] 0.1394 [0.0635] 0.3294∗∗ (0.1629)
Socialist vote share 0.3864 [0.1654] 0.4031 [0.1651] -0.1427∗ (0.1073)
Socialist mayor 0.3140 [0.4652] 0.3671 [0.4832] -0.0051 (0.0274)
Female mayor 0.0097 [0.0981] 0.0145 [0.1198] 0.0116 (0.0546)
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01 (one-tailed)
Notes: Columns 1–4 report means and standard deviations across treatment and comparison
municipalities, not weighted by population size. Columns 5 and 6 report estimates and robust
standard errors from an OLS regression with the percentage point increase in child care cov-
erage rate between 1976 and 1979 as the dependent variable. Earnings denotes pensionable
income in NOK 100,000. Socialist parties are defined as RV, SV and DNA. Densely populated
areas are contiguous zones of at least 200 people where the distance between houses is gen-
erally less than 50 meters (400 meters if separated by e.g. parks, rivers or industrial zones).
Average distance to zone center is the mean predicted travel distance in km from a citizen’s
home to the most populous census area in a contiguous zone of more than 2,000 people within
the municipality. Distance to neighboring center is the mean travel distance from the center
of a census area to the closest center in another census area within the same economic zone.
Standard deviations are in brackets and standard errors are in parentheses.
Table A2: Control variables.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
TT ITT SE(ITT) Mean
Male 0.0187 0.0033 0.0034 0.507
No. of older siblings -0.0052 -0.0009 0.0052 2.133
Mother’s age at first birth 0.0455 0.0081 0.0128 23.33
Father’s age at first birth 0.011 0.0020 0.0149 26.56
Mother’s edu. when child 2 y.o. -0.1047∗ -0.0187∗ 0.0118 9.662
Father’s edu. when child 2 y.o. -0.1624∗ -0.0290∗ 0.0159 10.37
Immigrant 0.0106 0.0019 0.0015 0.0566
Relocated 0.0337∗∗∗ 0.0060∗∗∗ 0.0017 0.0358
Estimations are based on OLS on equation (1), with controls listed in Table 3 and municipal-specific
fixed effects, excluding the dependent variable from the set of controls. ITT/TT = .1785 (i.e. the in-
crease in child care coverage following the reform in the treatment group relative to the comparison
group). Mean refers to the pre-reform means in the treatment group. Standard errors are robust to
within family clustering and heteroskedasticity.
